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FOREWORD 
The Debris Team is continuing its effort to develop and 
implement measures to control damage from debris in the 
Shuttle operational environment and to make the control 
measures a part of routine processing and operations. 
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Shuttle Mission STS-42 was launched at 9:52 a.m. local 1/22/92 
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1.0 Summary 
The pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle 
vehicle was conducted on 21 January 1992 from 0930 - 1030 
hours. The detailed walkdown of Launch Pad 39A and MLP-3 also 
included the primary flight elements OV-103 Discovery (14th 
flight), ET-52 (LWT 45), and BI-048 SRB's. There were no 
vehicle anomalies. Facility discrepancies were worked real-
time and no items were entered into OMI S0007, Appendix K. 
The vehicle was cryoloaded for flight on 22 January 1992. 
There were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 
violations. There were no ice/frost or TPS conditions outside 
of the established data base. Isolated patches of frost on the 
External Tank TPS acreage had melted prior to launch. Light 
condensate covered the ET TPS acreage at the time of launch. 
Three Ice/Frost Team observation/ anomalies were documented 
and found acceptable for launch per the LCC and NSTS-08303. 
The LH2 umbilical leak sensor detected no significant hydrogen 
during the cryoload. The tubing was successfully removed from 
the vehicle with no TPS contact or damage. 
A small amount of ice/frost had formed on the aft pyrotechnic 
canister bondline. Thin foam exists in this area due to an 
incorrect mold manufacture. The amount and location of the 
ice/frost was acceptable for launch per the NSTS-08303 
criteria. (The problem exists through end item EI-66. The mold 
will be changed to add more foam for EI-67 and subs. An El 
spec waiver will be issued for STS-45 and subs until existing 
items are expended. STS-42's umbilical was approved for use by 
PMRB.) 
A debris inspection of Pad 39A was performed after launch. No 
flight hardware was found. Launch damage to the holddown posts 
was minimal. EPON shim material on the south hoiddown posts 
was intact, but slightly debonded at the sidewalls on liD? #1, 
#2, and #6. Numerous voids were visible in the EPON shim 
sidewall material on HDP #1 and #2. There was no visual 
indication of a stud hang-up on any of the south holddown 
posts. An SRB liD? frangible nut web (2.0 x 0.25 inches) was 
found laying on top of the liD? #2 stud. The GH2 vent line had 
latched properly. Damage to the facility overall was minimal. 
A total of 132 film and video items were analyzed as part of 
the post launch data review. No major vehicle damage or lost 
flight hardware was observed that would have affected the 
mission. One IFA was generated as a result of the film and 
video data review. The on-orbit views of the External Tank 
showed two divots, approximately 8-12 inches in diameter, 
outboard of the -Y bipod ramp and forward of the LH2 tank-to-
intertank flange in the -Y+Z quadrant of the intertank 
acreage. The intertank TPS should remain intact with no loss 
of material during ascent. Although there was no photographic 
data showing the condition of the ET TPS in the +Y+Z quadrant, 
Fd
SOFI debris from the External Tank intertank and/or lower L02 
tank is the most likely cause of the excessive Orbiter tile 
damage. 
No frangible nut/ordnance fragments was visible falling from 
any of the holddown post DCS/stud holes. There was no evidence 
of stud hang-ups on any of the hoiddown posts. ET aft dome 
charring, plume recirculation, and SRB separation were 
nominal. OV-103 was not equipped to carry ET/ORB umbilical 
cameras. Orbiter performance, landing gear extension, wheel 
touchdown, and vehicle rollout after landing were normal. 
The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after 
retrieval. Both frustums exhibited a total of 24 debonds over 
fasteners. The field joint protection system closeouts were in 
generally good condition. There was no sign of broaching in 
any of the stud holes. Although the HDP #3 Debris Containment 
System (DCS) plunger was not seated, post flight disassembly 
of all eight DCS housings revealed virtually no loss of 
frangible nut/ordnance fragments. The overall system debris 
retention averaged 99 percent. This was the fifth flight 
utilizing the optimized link. Approximately 20 percent of the 
HDP #3 EPON shim material was missing and the substrate was 
charred. The shim material appeared to have been lost during 
ascent. 
A detailed post landing inspection of OV-103 (Discovery) was 
conducted on January 30-31, 1992, atAmes-Dryden (EAFB) in the 
Mate-Demate Device. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 209 
hits, of which 44 had a major dimension of one inch or 
greater. The Orbiter lower surface had a total of 159 hits, of 
which 38 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. Based 
on these numbers and comparison to statistics from previous 
missions of similar configuration, both the total number of 
Orbiter TPS debris hits and the number of hits with a major 
dimension of 1 inch or larger were greater than average. 
All of the tile hits on the lower surface were shallow (3/8 
inch or less) relative to the surface area. This type of tile 
damage is indicative of impact by a low density material. As a 
result of this tile damage, a debris damage/source investiga-
tion was conducted. Post flight inspections of the Orbiter and 
recovered SRB's revealed no loss of TPS or flight hardware. 
The TPS on the SRB's is more dense and results in deeper 
penetration. A mechanism to transport ET intertank foam to the 
Orbiter forward -lower surface area had been previously 
demonstrated. ET-52 was the second tank flown with the new 
two-gun spray process on the intertank. IFA STS-42-T-001 was 
taken against the loss of ET intertank foam as the probable 
source for the debris damage to Orbiter tiles on STS-42. 
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All ET/Orbiter (EO) separation ordnance device plungers 
appeared to have functioned properly. An ordnance connector 
from the LH2 umbilical outboard pyro location (Part No. 
NBS9GE8-2SE) fell to the runway when the ET door was opened. 
The entire exterior surface (flexible insulation blanket and 
thermal barrier) of Orbiter RH vent door #7 exhibited a 
yellow-orange discoloration. The surrounding Orbiter sidewall 
was not similarly discolored. 
A variety of residual materials were present in the post-
landing Orbiter samples and indicated sources such as Orbiter 
TPS, SRB/BSM exhaust residue, natural landing site products, 
organics, and paint. This data does not indicate a single 
source of damaging debris as all of these materials have been 
previously documented in post-landing sample reports. 
Additional testing performed for this mission included 
specially removed damaged tiles for testing at MSFC and the 
discolored RE vent door V. The MSFC testing is not complete 
yet' but the early results (non-destructive tests) do not show 
indications of debris particulate. KSC analysis showed the 
vent door discoloring was not a debris concern. 
A total of ten Post Launch Anomalies, including one IFA 
candidate, was observed during this mission assessment. 
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2.0 KSC ICE/FROST/DEBRIS TEAM ACTIVITIES 
Team Composition: NASA KSC, NASA MSFC, NASA JSC, 
LSOC SPC, RI - DOWNEY, MMMSS - MAF, 
USBI - BPC, MTI - UTAH 
Team Activities: 
1) Prelaunch Pad Debris Inspection 
Objective: Identify and evaluate potential debris 
material/sources.	 Baseline debris and 
debris sources existing from previous 
launches. 
Areas: MLP deck, ORB and SRB flame exhaust 
holes, FSS, Shuttle external surfaces 
Time: L - 1 day 
Requirements: OSD SOOUOO.030 - An engineering- 
debris inspection team shall inspect 
the Shuttle and launch pad to identify 
and resolve potential debris sources. 
The prelaunch vehicle and pad 
configuration shall be documented and 
photographed. 
Documents: OMI S6444 
Report: Generate PR'S and recommend corrective 
actions to pad managers. 
2) Launch Countdown Firing Room 2 
Objective: Evaluate ice/frost accumulation on the 
Shuttle and/or any observed debris 
utilizing OTV cameras. 
Areas: MLP deck, FSS, Shuttle external 
surfaces 
Time: T - 6 hours to Launch + 1 hour or 
propellant drain 
Requirements: OSD SOOFBO.005 - Monitor and video 
tape record ET TPS surfaces during 
loading through prepressurization. 
Documents: OMI S0007, OMI S6444 
Report: OIS call to NTD, Launch Director, and 
Shuttle managers. Generate IPR's.
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3) Ice/Frost TPS and Debris Inspection 
Objective: Evaluate any ice formation as 
potential debris material. Identify 
and evaluate any ORB, ET, or SRB TPS 
anomaly which may be a debris source 
or safety of flight concern. Identify 
and evaluate any other possible 
facility or vehicle anomaly. 
Areas: MLP deck, FSS, Shuttle external 
surfaces 
Time: T - 3 hours (during 2 hour BIH) 
Requirements: O?SD SOOUOO.020 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall inspect 
the Shuttle for ice/frost, TPS, and 
debris anomalies after cryo propellant 
loading.	 Evaluate, document, and 
photograph all anomalies. During the 
walkdown, inspect Orbiter aft engine 
compartment (externally) for water 
condensation and/or ice formation in 
or between aft compartment tiles. An 
IR scan is required during the Shuttle 
inspection to verify ET surface temp-
eratures.	 During the walkdown inspect 
ET TPS areas which cannot be observed 
by the OTV system. 
Documents: OMI S0007, OMI S6444 
Report: Briefing to NTD, Launch Director, 
Shuttle management; generate IPR's. 
4)	 Post Launch Pad Debris Inspection 
Objectives: Locate and identify debris that could 
have damaged the Shuttle during launch 
Areas: MLP zero level, flame exhaust holes 
and trenches, FSS, pad surfaces and 
slopes, extension of trenches to the 
perimeter fence, walkdown of the beach 
from Playalinda to Complex 40, aerial 
overview of inaccessible areas. 
Time: Launch + 1 hours (after pad safing, 
before washdown) 
Requirements: OMRSD SOOUOO.010 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall perform 
a post launch pad/area inspection to 
identify any lost flight or ground 
systems hardware and resultant debris 
sources. The post launch pad and area 
configuration shall be documented and 
photographed. 
Documents: OMI S0007, OMI S6444
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Report:	 Initial report to NTD and verbal 
briefing to Level II at L+8 hours; 
generate PR'S. 
5) Launch Data Review 
Objective: Detailed review of-high speed films 
video tapes, and photographs from pad 
cameras, range trackers, aircraft and 
vehicle onboard cameras to determine 
possible launch damage to the flight 
vehicle. Identify debris and debris 
sources. 
Time: Launch + 1 day to Launch + 6 days 
Requirements: OSD S00tJ00.011 - An engineering film 
review and analysis shall be performed 
on all engineering launch film as soon 
as possible to identify any debris 
damage to the Shuttle. Identify flight 
flight vehicle or ground system damage 
that could affect orbiter flight 
operations or future SSV launches. 
Documents: OMI S6444 
Report: Daily reports to Level II Mission 
Management Team starting on L+1 day 
through landing; generate PR's. 
6) SRB Post Flight/Retrieval Inspection 
Objective: Evaluate potential SRB debris sources. 
Data will be correlated with observed 
Orbiter post landing TPS damage. 
Areas: SRB external surfaces (Hangar AF, 
CCAFS) 
Time: Launch + 24 hours (after on-dock, 
before hydrolasing) 
Requirements: OSD SOOUOO.013 - An engineering 
debris damage inspection team shall 
perform a post retrieval inspection 
of the SRB's to identify any damage 
caused by launch debris.
	 Anomalies 
must be documented/photographed and 
coordinated with the results of the 
post launch shuttle/pad area debris 
inspection. 
Documents: OMI B8001 
Report: Daily reports to Level II Mission 
Management Team. Preliminary report 
to SRB Disassembly Evaluation Team. 
Generate PR's.
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7) Orbiter Post Landing Debris Damage Assessment 
Objective: Identify and evaluate areas of Orbiter 
TPS damage due to debris and correlate 
if possible, source and time of 
occurrence. Additionally, runways are 
inspected for debris/sources of debris 
Areas: Orbiter TPS surfaces, runways 
Time: After vehicle safing on runway, before 
towing 
Requirements: OSD SOOUOO.040 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall perform a 
prelanding runway inspection to 
identify, document, and collect debris 
that could result in orbiter damage. 
Runway debris and any facility anomal-
ies which cannot be removed/corrected 
by the Team shall be documented and 
photographed; the proper management 
authority shall be notified and 
corrective actions taken. 
Requirements: ONRSD SOOUOO.050 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall perform 
a post landing runway inspection to 
identify and resolve potential debris 
sources that may have caused vehicle 
damage but was not present or was not 
identified during pre-launch runway 
inspection. Obtain photographic 
documentation of any debris, debris 
sources, or flight hardware that may 
have been lost on landing. 
Requirements: OSD SOOUOO.060 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall map, 
document, and photograph debris-
related Orbiter TPS damage and debris 
sources. 
Requirements: OSD SOOUOO.012 - An engineering 
debris damage inspection team shall 
perform a post landing inspection of 
the orbiter vehicle to identify any 
damage caused by launch debris. Any 
anomalies must be documented/ 
photographed and coordinated with the 
results of the post launch shuttle/ 
pad area debris inspection. 
Requirements: OSD V09AJO.095 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall perform 
temperature measurements of RCC nose 
cap and RCC RH wing leading edge 
panels 9 and 17. 
Documents: OMI S0026, OMI S0027, OMI S0028
8 
Report:	 Briefing to NASA Convoy Commander 
and generate PR's. Preliminary 
report to Level II on the day of 
landing followed by a more detailed 
update the next day. 
8) Level II report 
Objective:	 Compile and correlate data from all 
inspections and analyses. Results 
of the debris assessment, along 
with recommendations for corrective 
actions, are presented directly to 
Level II via SIR and PRCB. Paper 
copy of complete report follows in 
3 to 4 weeks. (Ref NASA Technical 
Memorandum series) 
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3.0 PRE-LAUNCH BRIEFING 
The Ice/Frost/Debris Team briefing for launch activities was 
conducted on 21 January 1992 at 0830 hours with the following 
key personnel present: 
S. Higginbotham NASA - KSC STI, Ice/Debris Assessment 
B. Davis NASA - KSC STI, Ice/Debris Assessment 
G. Katnik NASA - KSC Lead, Ice/Debris/Photo Team 
B. Speece NASA - KSC Lead, ET Thermal Protection 
B. Bowen NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
K. Tenbusch NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
P. Rosado NASA - KSC Chief, ET Mechanical Systems 
J. Rivera NASA - KSC Lead, ET Structures 
M. Bassignani NASA - KSC ET Processing, Debris Assess 
A. Oliu NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
A. Biamonte NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
W. Teng LSOC - SPC ET Processing, Ice Assess 
R. Seale LSOC - SPC ET Processing, Ice Assess 
J. Blue LSOC - SPC ET Processing, Ice Assess 
M. Dean LSOC - SPC ET Processing, Ice Assess 
Z. Byrns NASA - JSC Level II Integration 
C. Gray MMC	 - MAF ET TPS & Materials Design 
S. Copsey MMC	 - MAP ET TPS Testing/Certif 
J. McClymonds RI	 - DNY Debris Assess, LVL II Integ 
K. Mayer RI	 - LSS Vehicle Integration 
D. Denaberg USBI - LSS SRB Processing 
J. Cook MTI	 - LSS SRM Processing
These personnel participated in various team activities, 
assisted in the collection and evaluation of data, and 
contributed to reports contained in this document. 
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3.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/P2U) DEBRIS INSPECTION 
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle 
was conducted on 21 January 1992 from 0930 - 1030 hours. The 
detailed walkdown of Launch Pad 39A and MLP-3 also included the 
primary flight elements OV-103 Discovery (14th flight), ET-52 
(LWT 45), and BI-048 SRB' s. Documentary photographs were taken 
of facility anomalies, potential sources of vehicle damaging 
debris, and vehicle configuration changes. Two such changes 
flown for the second time consisted of a new LH2 pressurization 
line graphite/epoxy fairing at the intertank feedthrough and 
the ET intertank two-gun SOFI spray process. 
Due to the continued concern over potential hydrogen leakage 
from the ET/ORB LH2 umbilical interface area during cryoload/ 
launch, temporary hydrogen leak detectors LD54 and LD55 were 
installed at the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical until a permanent sensor 
could be designed and installed. The tygon tubes are intended 
to remain in place during cryogenic loading and be removed by 
the Ice Inspection Team during the T-3 hour hold. 
There were no vehicle anomalies. A cap on a feedthrough pipe 
west of the SSME exhaust hole and conduit covers in the north 
east corner of the MLP were loose. Round covers on the Portable 
Purge Unit (PPU) electrical conduit boxes were also loose. 
These discrepancies were corrected real-time by Pad Operations 
personnel and no items were entered in S0007, Appendix K. 
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Pre-launch configuration of bipod jack pad closeouts. 
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Pre-launch view of the ET aft dome apex and manhole covers 
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4.0 LAUNCH 
STS-42 was launched at 22:14:52:33 GMT (09:52:33 a.m. local) on 
22 January 1992. 
4.1 ICE/FROST INSPECTION 
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was 
performed on 22 January 1992 from 0435 to 0655 hours during the 
two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There 
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OS, or NSTS-08303 violations. 
There were no conditions outside of the established data base. 
Ambient weather conditions at the time of the inspection were: 
Temperature:	 57.4 F 
Relative Humidity:	 89.1 % 
Wind Speed:	 7.6 Knots 
Wind Direction:	 023 Degrees 
The portable STI infrared scanner was utilized to obtain 
surface temperature measurements for an overall thermal 
assessment of the vehicle, as shown in Figure 1 and 2. 
4.2 ORBITER 
No Orbiter tile anomalies -were observed. All RCS paper covers 
were intact and bonded to the RCS thrusters. The water spray 
boiler plugs were intact. The average Orbiter surface tempera-
ture was •55 degrees F. The average surface temperatures of the 
engine mounted heat shields were 52 degrees F for SS #1, 44 
degrees F for SSME #2, and 52 degrees F for SSME #3. Light 
frost coated the SS #1 and #2 heat shield-to-nozzle inter-
faces along the full circumference. Some frost was present on 
the SS
	 #2 drain lines. The SS
	 #3 heat shield was dry. No 
GOX vapors originated from inside the SSME nozzles. No conden-
sate was present on base heat shield tiles. 
4.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
No SRB anomalies or loose ablator/cork were observed. The K5NA 
closeouts of the aft booster stiffener ring splice plates were 
intact. The STI portable infrared scanner recorded RH and LH 
SRB case surface temperatures between 50 and 58 degrees F. In 
comparison, the Cyclops radiometer measured temperatures 
between 54 and 59 degrees F and the GEl (Ground Environment 
Instrumentation) measured temperatures between 54 and 58 
degrees F. All measured temperatures were above the 34 degree F 
minimum requirement. The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk 
Temperature (PT) supplied by MTI was 61 degrees F, which was 
within the required range of 44-86 degrees F. 
16
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4.4 EXTERNAL TANK 
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run 
from 0145 to 0945 hours and the results tabulated in Figure 3. 
The program predicted condensate with no ice accumulation on 
the TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload. As the ambient 
temperature dropped during the night and reached a low point at 
approximately 0400 hours, SURFICE predicted below-freezing 
temperatures with ice/frost formation and/or freezing run-off 
condensate on the upper LH2 tank. Ice Team inspection revealed 
patches of frost on the +Y+Z acreage. 
There was light condensate but no ice accumulation on the L02 
tank ogive and barrel sections. Small isolated frost spots on 
the L02 tank +Z barrel section and L02 tank-to-intertank flange 
-Y+Z closeout were visible during the Ice Team inspection, but 
soon melted. There were no TPS anomalies. The tumble valve 
cover was intact. There were no anomalies on the pressurization 
line and support ramps. The STI measured surface temperatures 
that averaged 52 degrees F on the ogive and 48 degrees F on the 
barrel section. In comparison, the Cyclops radiometer measured 
temperatures that averaged of 49 degrees F on the ogive and 45 
degrees F on the barrel; SURFICE predicted temperatures of 47 
degrees F on the ogive and 42 degrees F on the barrel. 
The intertank TPS acreage was dry. There were no anomalies with 
the new intertank TPS two-gun spray configuration or the LH2 
pressurization line graphite/epoxy fairing. No frost spots were 
present in the stringer valleys. No unusual vapors or ice 
formations were present on the ET umbilical carrier plate. The 
portable STI measured surface temperatures that averaged 57 
degrees F and the Cyclops radiometer measured temperatures that 
averaged 56 degrees F. 
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. Light condensate 
was present on the LH2 tank acreage and aft dome. There were no 
ice accumulations on the acreage. Isolated patches of frost on 
the +Y+Z quadrant acreage had melted by the end of the Ice Team 
inspection. Isolated frost spots on the LH2 tank-to-intertank 
flange -Y+Z closeout also melted. The portable STI measured 
surface temperatures that averaged 45 degrees F on the upper 
LH2 tank and 47 degrees F on the lower LH2 tank. In comparison, 
the Cyclops radiometer measured temperatures that averaged 44 
degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 49 degrees F on the lower 
LH2 tank; SURFICE predicted temperatures of 39 degrees F on the 
upper LH2 tank and 47 degrees F on the lower LH2 tank. 
There were no anomalies on the bipods, PAL ramp, cable 
tray/press line ice/frost ramps, longerons, thrust struts, 
manhole covers, or aft dome apex. Ice/frost accumulations were 
present along the -Y bipod ramp closeout, the LH2 tank PAL ramp 
closeout, and the aft edges of the ice/frost ramps. Two small 
frost spots had formed on the +Y longeron and one spot on the 
+Z manhole cover at the 2 o'clock position. Some ice/frost was 
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present in the ET/SRB cable tray-to-upper strut fairing expan-
sion joints. Ice/frost covered the lower EB fittings outboard 
to the strut pin hole with condensate on the rest of the 
fitting. The struts were dry. 
Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in the L02 feedline 
support brackets. Crusty, somewhat denser than usual ice/frost 
had formed in the L02 feedline bellows. Although the amounts of 
ice/frost in the bellows were slightly greater than usual, the 
accumulations were acceptable per the NSTS-08303 criteria. 
There were no TPS anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. The 
purge barrier (baggie) was configured properly and was holding 
positive purge pressure. There were no accumulations of 
ice/frost on the acreage areas of the umbilical. Ice/frost 
fingers 4 inches in length had formed on the separation bolt 
pyrotechnic canister purge vents. Normal venting of nitrogen 
purge gas had occurred during tanking, stable replenish, and 
launch.	 - 
Ice/frost had formed in both LH2 feedline bellows and on the 
straight section, in the LH2 recirculation line bellows, and on 
both burst disks. 
Isolated ice/frost formations were present on the inboard, top, 
and outboard sides of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier. 
Ice/frost fingers 4-6 inches in length had formed on the pyro 
canister and plate gap purge vents. A small amount of ice/frost 
had formed on the aft pyrotechnic canister bondline. Thin foam 
exists in this area due to an incorrect mold manufacture. The 
amount and location of the ice/frost was acceptable for launch 
per the NSTS-08303 criteria. (The problem exists through end 
item EI-66. The mold will be changed to add more foam for EI-67 
and subs. An El spec waiver will be issued for STS-45 and subs 
until existing items are expended. STS-42's umbilical was 
approved for use by local PMRB.) Normal venting of helium purge 
gas had occurred during tanking, stable replenish, and launch. 
There were no unusual vapors emanating from the umbilicals nor 
any evidence of cryogenic drips. No ice or frost was present on 
the cable tray vent hole. The 17-inch flapper valve actuator 
access port foam plug was properly closed out with no ice/frost 
on the bondline. 
The ET/ORB hydrogen detection sensor tygon tubing was in proper 
position prior to removal. The tubing was successfully removed 
from the vehicle with no flight hardware contact or TPS damage. 
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations /anomalies consisted 
of 3 OTV recorded items: 
Anomaly 001 documented an ice/frost formation at the ET/ORB LH2 
umbilical aft pyro canister closeout along the forward 
bondline. The condition was acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
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Anomaly 002 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations 
on the L02 and LH2 ET/ORB umbilicals pyro canister purge vents, 
LH2 feedline bellows, LH2 recirculation line bellows, and LH2 
purge barrier baggie. These formations were acceptable per 
NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 003 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations 
in the L02 feedline bellows and support brackets. These forma-
tions were acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
4.5 FACILITY 
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and 
properly configured for launch. There was no debris on the MLP 
deck or in the SRB holddown post areas. 
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-0 
umbilicals, though typical accumulations of ice/frost were 
present on the cryogenic lines and purge shrouds. There was 
also no apparent leakage anywhere on the GH2 vent line or GUCP. 
The GH2 vent line modification prevented ice from forming, but 
some ice/frost, which was expected, had accumulated on the GUCP 
legs and on the uninsulated parts of the umbilical carrier 
plate. 
Visual and infrared observations of the GOX seals confirmed no 
leakage. No ET nosecone/footprint damage was visible after the 
GOX vent hood was retracted. Small icicles less than 3/4-inch 
in length had formed on the north GOX vent duct during 
cryoload, but had melted before launch. 
23
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Overall view of OV-103, ET-52 (LWT 45), and BI-048 SRB's. 
Isolated patches of frost had accumulated on the TPS acreage of 
the ET LH2 tank.
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Light condensate, but no ice or frost, had accumulated on the
ET L02 tank 
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Ice/frost had formed along the bondline of the PAL ramp. 
Ice/frost accumulations in the L02 feedline support bracket and 
upper bellows were acceptable per the NSTS-08303 criteria. 
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Ice/frost accumulations on the LH2 tank acreage and along the 
PAL ramp had melted prior to launch. Ice/frost formations in 
the L02 feedline support brackets were acceptable per the 
NSTS-08303 criteria.
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Ice/frost formation along the -Y bipod ramp closeout outboard 
and aft bondline was acceptable per the NSTS-08303 criteria. 
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There was no apparent leakage at the GUCP. As expected, ice/ 
frost had formed on the GUCP legs and on the uninsulated parts 
of the umbilical carrier plate.
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Crusty, somewhat denser than usual ice/frost had formed in the 
L02 feedline bellows. Although the amounts of ice/frost in the 
bellows were slightly greater than usual, the accumulations 
were acceptable per the NSTS-08303 criteria. 
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Overall view of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. There were no unusual 
vapors emanating from the umbilical nor any evidence of 
cryogenic drips. Ice/frost accumulations in the recirculation 
line bellows, on the burst disks, on the umbilical purge vents, 
and on the top side of the umbilical were typical. 
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Ice/frost formations on the lower plate 
pyro canister purge vent, and in the 
bellows were typical. The cable tray 
flapper valve actuator tool access por 
ice or frost accumulations.
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gap purge vent, the aft 
LH2 recirculation line 
vent hole and 17-inch 
t closeout exhibited no 
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Overall view of ET aft dome apex and manhole covers 
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Overall view of the SSME's, RH OMS nozzle, RH RCS stinger
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Frost coated the SSME #2 drain line and engine-mounted heat 
shield-to-nozzle interface along the full circumference. Some 
condensate was also present on the engine mounted heat shield. 
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5.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The post launch inspections of the MLP, FSS, Pad apron, and 
areas within the Pad perimeter fence were conducted on 22 
January 1992 from Launch+1.5 to 4 hours. No TPS materials were 
found. The only flight hardware recovered consisted of an SRB 
holddown post frangible nut web (2.0 x 0.25 inches) laying on 
top of the HDP #2 stud. 
SRB plume erosion of the south holddown posts was typical. All 
south HDP EPON shim material was intact, but slightly debonded 
at the sidewalls on HDP #1, #2, and #6. Numerous voids were 
visible in the EPON shim sidewall material on HDP #1 and #2. 
There was no visual indication of a stud hang-up on any of the 
south hoiddown posts. All of the north post doghouse blast 
covers were in the closed position and exhibited minimal 
erosion. The SRB aft skirt purge lines were in place but 
slightly damaged. The SRB T-O umbilicals and connector saver 
sacrificial pieces showed normal plume impingement effects. 
The GOX vent arm, OAA, and TSM's showed the usual minor amount 
of damage. The GH2 vent arm was latched on the eighth tooth of 
the latching mechanism and had no loose cables (static retract 
lanyard). The GH2 vent line appeared to have retracted normally 
and showed typical signs of SRB plume impingement. The ET 
intertank access structure also sustained typical plume heating 
effects. 
Damage to the facility appeared to be less than usual and 
included: 
1. Fire brick from the SRB flame trench was scattered 
across the pad acreage north to the perimeter fence. 
2. A metal lighting fixture was detached from a location 
over the stairwell and was found on the FSS 95 foot 
level 
3. Three metal signs from the FSS 155 and 255 foot levels 
were kound on the grating. 
4. Typical amounts of facility nuts, bolts, pins, and line 
caps were found on the pad apron and were probably not 
a threat to the vehicle. 
All seven emergency egress slidewire baskets were secured on 
the FSS 195 foot level and sustained no launch damage. 
MLP-3 was configured with overpressure sensors at the top of 
both TSM's, at the bottom of both SRB exhaust holes, and at the 
bottom of the SSME exhaust hole. All sensor readings were 
consistent with previous launches and within nominal limits. 
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Inspection of the pad was completed on 23 January 1992 along 
with the areas outside the pad perimeter, railroad tracks, the 
beach from TJCS-10 to the Titan complex, the beach access road, 
and the ocean areas under the vehicle flight path. No flight 
hardware or TPS materials were found. 
Patrick AFB and MILA radars were configured in a mode for 
increased sensitivity for the purpose of observing any debris 
falling from the vehicle during ascent but after SRB separation 
(due to the masking effect of the SRB exhaust plume). Most of 
the signal registrations were very weak and often barely detec-
table, which generally compares with the types of particles 
detected on previous Shuttle flights. A total of 53 particles 
were imaged in the T+143 to 368 second time period. Nineteen 
of the particles were imaged by only one radar, 22 particles 
were imaged by two radars, and 12 particles was imaged by all 
three radars. 
Post launch pad inspection anomalies are listed in Section 10. 
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Plume erosion of the south SRB holddown posts was typical. EPON 
shim material was intact, but slightly debonded from the 
hoiddown post shoe sidewalls on HDP #1, #2, and #6. There was 
no visual indication of a stud hang-up on any of the south 
hoiddown posts.
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North HDP blast covers were in the closed position and

exhibited typical SRB plume erosion effects 
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Post launch condition of the SRB T-O umbilical carrier plate

and electrical connector sacrificial pieces 
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Typical post launch debris included SRB holddown post frangible 
nut web (2.OxO.25 inches), SRB throat plug material, facility 
bolts and hardware, pneumatic line caps/covers, and strips of 
insulation.
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6.0 FILM REVIEW AND PROBLEM REPORTS 
A total of 132 film and video data items, which included 
forty-nine videos, fifty 16mm films, twenty-seven 35mm films, 
and six 70mm films were reviewed starting on launch day. 
One IFA was generated as a result of the film and video data 
review. On-orbit views of the External Tank showed two divots, 
approximately 8-12 inches in diameter, outboard of the 
-Y bipod 
ramp and forward of the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange in the 
intertank acreage (-Y+Z quadrant). The intertank TPS should 
remain intact with no loss of material during ascent. Although 
there is no photographic data showing the condition of the ET 
TPS in the +Y+Z quadrant, SOFI debris from the External Tank 
intertank and/or lower L02 tank is the most likely cause of the 
Orbiter tile damage. 
Post Launch Anomalies observed in the Film Review were 
presented to the Mission Management Team, Shuttle managers, and 
vehicle systems engineers. These anomalies are listed in 
Section 10. 
6.1 LAUNCH FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed 
that would have affected the mission. 
Helium purge vapors and ice build-up on the LH2 ET/ORB umbili-
cal had been typical during tanking, stable replenish, flight 
pressurization, and launch. There were no unusual vapors or 
cryogenic drips (OTV 009, 054, 063) 
SSME ignition and Mach diamond formation appeared normal. Free 
burning hydrogen drifted upward to the OHS pods and under the 
body flap (RSS STI, CIS-2 STI, E-2, 3, 19, 20) 
SSME ignition caused numerous pieces of ice/frost to fall from 
the ET/Orbiter umbilicals. Some pieces of ice appeared to con-
tact the umbilical cavity sill and were deflected outward. No 
damage to Orbiter tiles or ET TPS was visible (OTV 009, 054, 
063, 064). Pieces of ice continued to fall from the umbilical 
area after liftoff. 
SSME ignition vibration/ acoustics caused the loss of tile. 
surface coating material from Six locations on the OHS nozzle 
heat shield and Orbiter base heat shield (E-23, 24). 
SSME ignition caused 6-7 pieces of ice to shake loose from the 
uninsulated parts of the GUCP (E-35). Other film items (E-26, 
4, and 12) showed light colored objects falling to the MLP deck 
and may be pieces of ice from the GUCP or the uninsulated GH2 
vent line elbow in the ET intertank access structure. None of 
these objects appeared to contact the Orbiter. The light 
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colored object, most likely ice from the GUCP or the GH2 vent 
line, previously observed in film item E-12 was also visible in 
film item E-13. The object fell into the LH SRB exhaust hole 
near HDP #6. 
Light frost was present in the southwest (-Y) ET GOX vent 
louver. There was no TPS damage to the ET nose cone acreage, 
footprint, or fairing (OTV 061, 062). Vehicle twang 
(approximately 33 inches) was typical (E-79). 
Light colored mark on LH wing/elevon interface may be a piece 
of tape. SSME ignition appeared normal (E-76). 
There were no major facility anomalies. The Orbiter LH2 and L02 
T-0 umbilicals disconnected and retracted properly (OTV 049, 
050). GUCP disconnect from the External Tank was nominal (OTV 
004). The GH2 vent line appeared to latch normally with no 
rebound (OTV 060) . No swing arms or other pad structures 
contacted the vehicle during liftoff. Separation of the GUCP 
from the External Tank was nominal. The GH2 vent arm retracted 
and latched properly. There was no excessive slack in the 
static retract lanyard (E-31, 33, 41, 42, 50). 
There was no evidence of stud hang-ups on any of the hoiddown 
posts. No debris fell from the DCS/stud holes. Closure of 
north holddown post doghouse blast covers was nominal. A small 
dark particle, which may have been a K5NA trimming or piece of 
shim putty, originated near the HDP #1 shoe and fell into the 
SRB exhaust hole (E-9, 12). A piece of instafoam from the LH 
SRB aft skirt near HDP #7 came loose after T-0 (E-28). 
Separation of the SRB T-0 umbilicals from the aft, skirts was 
nominal. The separation planes remained generally parallel 
during retraction. The connector savers were flush with the 
plate (EX2, EX3). 
Six thin, rectangular, flexible objects appeared out of the SRB 
exhaust holes/sound suppression water troughs (three pieces 
near liD? #5/liD? #7 and three more pieces near liD? #6/liD? #8). 
Although not orange in color like the water trough material, 
the objects may be related to the installation of the water 
troughs (E-12, 16). The thin, rectangular, flexible objects in 
film item E-16 that appeared out of the SRB exhaust holes/sound 
suppression water troughs were also visible in film items E-11 
and E-14. These objects may be cloth part tags from the SRB 
sound suppression water troughs. Cord from the water troughs 
appeared in film item E-10 near holddown post #3. A 6"x4" piece 
of instafoam broke away near the inboard edge of HDP #7 (E-11). 
A white particle, probably an RCS paper cover or piece of ice, 
was visible near the SSME plume after the roll maneuver (TV-4). 
A light colored particle, appearing out of the RH SRB plume 
after the roll maneuver, was most likely a piece of SP.B aft 
skirt instafoam (TV-21).
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Film item E-60 confirmed that water flowed properly from all 
ML? rairibirds. 
Flashes occurred in the SSME plume during ascent at 19 and 34 
seconds MET (E-54, 213, 223, 224) 
Clusters of particles falling aft of the Orbiter after comple-
tion of the roll maneuver were traced to the forward RCS 
thrusters and were pieces of RCS paper covers. Other pieces of 
RCS paper covers were visible passing over the Orbiter wings. 
Pieces of ET/ORB purge barrier baggie material were also 
visible caught in the aerodynamic recirculation and falling aft 
of the vehicle (E-54, 59, 212, 213, 222, 223) 
Just after the roll maneuver and during ascent, over 100 light 
colored particles dropped out of the SRB plume. These particles 
appeared to have low densities and are believed to be pieces of 
SRB aft skirt instafoam (E-59). 
SSME closeout blankets appeared intact while in view (E-212). 
One piece of thermal curtain tape was loose on the LH SRB aft 
skirt (E-212) 
Movement of the body flap appeared similar in amplitude and 
frequency to that observed on previous flights (E-207, 212). 
Optical linear distortions appeared in film item E-207. This 
phenomenon has been observed on previous flights. 
Localized flow condensation appeared on the vehicle during 
ascent. ET aft dome charring, exhaust plume recirculation, and 
SRB separation appeared nominal (E-207, E-204, 205, 206). MSFC 
and JSC reported apparent orange flashes near the RH SRB ET 
attach ring approximately 5 seconds after separation. These 
flashes may be the result of looking through the plume of the 
LH SRB. Examination of the recovered RH SRB, particularly the 
areas of the aft booster, ET attach ring, nozzles, and TVC 
revealed no hardware damage and no likely sources for the 
flashes.
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Thin, flexible, light-colored objects appeared out of the SRB 
exhaust holes/hoiddown post haunch areas after T-O and were 
identified as cloth part tags attached to the sound suppression 
water troughs (Film item E-16)
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Thin, light-colored object with stiaiciht edges in this film 
item E-26 view may be one of the cloth part tags from the SRB 
sound suppression water troughs that were visible in film E-16. 
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Film item E-28 showed a piece of instafoam breaking loose after 
liftoff from the LH SRB aft skirt near Holddown Post V. 
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6.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
OV-103 was not equipped to carry ETIORB umbilical separation 
cameras. 
Review/analysis of on-orbit photography included twenty-nine 
70mm still photos taken by the crew (DTO-0312). The images were 
generally dark and the focus was soft. In addition, 16mm motion 
picture footage was also taken by the crew. Camera shake 
prevented detail from being discernible. 
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed 
that would have been a safety of flight concern. 
Two light spots in the intertank -Y+Z quadrant acreage outboard 
of the -Y bipod ramp and forward of the intertank-to-LH2 tank 
flange closeout appeared to be possible divots 8-12 inches in 
diameter. 
There were no apparent anomalies on the L02 tank, LH2 tank, and 
aft dome TPS acreage. The BSM burn scars were typical. The 
nosecone, intertank access door,. GH2 umbilical carrier plate, 
ET/SRB forward attach points, and RSS antennae were in nominal 
configuration. 
The +Y+Z quadrant of the ET was not photographed. 
6.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
Orbiter performance in the Heading Alignment Circle (HAC) and 
final approach was nominal. No anomalies occurred during 
landing gear extension and wheel touchdown. 
Both main landing gear touched down almost simultaneously with 
the right side slightly ahead of the left gear. Touchdown of 
the nose gear was smooth. There were no vehicle anomalies or 
unusual control surface deflections during the rollout. 
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--
On-orbit view of the External Tank shortly after separation 
from the Orbiter. No major damage or lost flight hardware was 
observed that would have been a safety-of--flight concern. 
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Two light spots in the intertank -Y+Z quadrant acreage outboard 
of the -Y bipod ramp and forward of the intertank-to-LH2 tank 
flange closeout appeared to be possible divots 8-12 inches in 
diameter. No anomalies were visible on the nosecone or L02/LH2 
tank acreage areas.
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View of External Tank -Y side showed the two divots in the 
intertarik acreage near the bipods. Other bright features in the 
intertank area are the RSS antenna panel, -Y ET/SRB attach 
fitting, flight door, and aero vent panel. 
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View of External Tank -Y+Z quadrant showed no intertank TPS 
acreage anomalies after the vehicle had been cryoload that 
would account for the divots observed in the on-orbit photos. 
54	 ORIGN,\L P C. 
COLOR PHOTO ;APH
7.0 SEB POST FLIGHT/RETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT 
Both Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and 
debris sources at CCAFS Hangar AF on 27 January 1992 from 0800 
to 1100 hours. From a debris standpoint, both SRB's were in 
excellent condition. 
7.1 RH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The RH frustum was missing no TPS but had 14 MSA-2 debonds over 
fasteners. There was minor localized blistering of the Hypalon 
paint (Figure 4). All BSM covers were locked in the fully 
opened position. 
The RH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. The 
phenolic plates on both RSS antennae were intact. The forward 
separation bolt and electrical cables appeared to have 
separated cleanly. No pins were missing from the frustum 
severance ring. Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred 
around the ET/SRB attach point and systems tunnel cover (Figure 
5) 
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were 
generally in good condition. Minor trailing edge damage to the 
FJPS and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting 
from severance of the nozzle extension. 
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB 
aft struts, ETA ring, lEA, and all three aft booster stiffener 
rings appeared undamaged. A 6"x3" area of TPS on the forward 
side of the upper strut fairing at the separation plane was 
missing and the substrate was charred. The loss of TPS in this 
area may have occurred during strut separation. The aft booster 
stiffener ring splice plate closeouts were intact and no K5NA 
material was missing prior to water impact. 
The phenolic material on the kick ring was intact and had not 
delaminated. Two K5NA protective domes between HDP #1 and #3 
were lost from bolt heads on the aft side of the phenolic kick 
ring prior to water impact (sooted substrate). The aft skirt 
acreage TPS was generally in good condition. K5NA was missing 
from all aft BSM nozzles (Figure 6). 
The HDP #3 Debris Containment System (DCS) plunger was not 
seated. This was the fifth flight utilizing the optimized link. 
There was no sign of broaching in any of the stud holes. 
HDP #3 EPON shim was almost completely intact. None of the EPON 
shim material was lost from HDP #4 during ascent. 
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The RH frustum was missing no TPS but had 14 MSA-2 debonds over 
fasteners. There was minor localized blistering of the Hypalon 
paint.
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The RH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. Both 
RSS antenna phenolic plates were intact. Minor blistering of 
the Hypalon paint occurred around the ETISRB attach point. 
60
L OLOR PHCTOGRA;:H
*'U 
414j 
ofli 
.4) 
41, 
1-I 
)
w 
14 
41;	 4!j 
.11	 41) 
•4J4 
41; 4J4' tj" 
o	 -.-i 
4-)	 41)
iU' 4 41) 
1-1 
a; I•44j 
43)	 0) 
4)	 1.4 
41 
il-I	
.4-) 
0 
o 
,-.0 
.1.10 
0 
UN 
-'4 
H 
'44.
4-I 
a) 
0 
tI
ORIGINAL PtC:E 61	 LOLOR PHOTOcpA
VFW 
,-
The HDP #3 Debris Containment System (DCS) plunger was not 
seated. The EPON shim material was almost completely intact. 
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There was no sign of broaching in any of the stud holes. None 
of the EPON shim material was lost prior to re-entry. 
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7.2 LH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The LH frustum was missing no TPS but had 10 MSA-2 debonds over 
fasteners. There was minor localized blistering of the Hypalon 
paint (Figure 7). The BSM covers were locked in the fully 
opened position though the lower left cover attach ring was 
deformed and the cover bent back to the 150 degree position. 
The LH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. The 
phenolic plates on both RSS antennae were intact. The forward 
separation bolt and electrical cables appeared to have 
separated cleanly. No pins were missing from the frustum 
severance ring. Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred 
forward of the ET/SRB attach point and on the systems tunnel 
cover (Figure 8) 
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were in good 
condition. Minor trailing edge damage to the FJPS and the GEl 
cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from severance of 
the nozzle extension. 
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB 
aft struts, lEA, ETA ring, and all three aft booster stiffener 
rings appeared undamaged. A 3"xl" area of TPS on the forward 
side of the upper strut fairing at the separation plane was 
missing and the substrate was charred. The loss of TPS in this 
area may have occurred during strut separation. The aft booster 
stiffener ring splice plate closeouts were Intact and no K5NA 
material was missing prior to water impact. 
One K5NA protective dome was missing from a bolt head on the 
aft side of the phenolic kick ring prior to water impact 
(charred substrate). The aft skirt acreage TPS was generally in 
good condition (Figure 9). K5NA was missing from all aft BSM 
nozzles. 
All four HDP Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were 
seated. This was the fifth flight utilizing the optimized link. 
There was no sign of broaching in any of the stud holes. 
Approximately 10 percent of the HDP #7 EPON shim material was 
missing prior to water impact and the substrate was charred. 
None of the EPON shim material was lost from HDP #8 during 
ascent.
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fasteners. The ESM covers were locked in the fully opened posi-
tion though the lower left cover attach ring was deformed and 
the cover bent back to the 150 degree position.
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The LH forward skirt exhibited no MSA-2 debonds or missing TPS.
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A 3"xl" area of TPS on the forward side of the ET/SBB upper 
strut fairing at the separation plane was missing and the 
substrate was charred. The loss of TPS in this area may have 
occurred during strut separation. 
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All four HDP Debris Containment System plungers were seated. 
There was no sign of broaching in any of the stud holes. 
Approximately 10 percent of the HDP #7 EPON shim was missing 
prior to splashdown and the substrate was charred. 
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7.3 RECOVERED SRB DISASSEMBLY FINDINGS 
Post flight disassembly of the Debris Containment System (DCS) 
housings revealed an overall system retention of 99 percent and 
individual hoiddown post retention percentages as listed: 
% of Nut without
HDP # 2 large halves 
1 99 
2 99 
3 99 
4 99 
5 99 
6 99 
7 99 
8 99
% of Ordnance 
fragments % Overall 
93 99 
91 98 
96 99 
99 99 
97 99 
98 99 
95 99 
95 99 
STS-42 was the fifth flight to utilize the new "optimized" 
frangible links in the holddown post DCS's.. The link was 
designed to increase the DCS plunger velocity and improve the 
seating alignment while leaving the stud ejection velocity the 
same. The design was intended to prevent ordnance debris from 
falling out of the DCS yet not increase the likelihood of a 
stud hang-up. According to NSTS-07700, the Debris Containment 
System should retain a minimum of 90 percent of the ordnance 
debris. Overall percentages of retention for the four previous 
flights utilizing the "optimized" link are: 
BI-044	 BI-045	 BI-046	 BI-047 
HDP #
	
STS-40	 STS-43	 STS-48	 STS-44 
1	 99% 98% 99% 99% 
2	 99% 31% 88% 99% 
3	 38% 99% 99% 99% 
4	 99% 99% 99% 99% 
5	 23% 99% 58% 99% 
6	 99% 99% 99% 99% 
7	 62% 99% 99% 99% 
8	 99% 99% 99% 99%
TOTAL	 77%	 90%	 92%	 99% 
Debris Loss
	 58 oz	 25 oz
	 190z	 negl 
SRB Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 10. 
73 
8.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT 
A post landing debris inspection of OV-103 (Discovery) was 
conducted on January 30 and 31, 1992, at Ames-Dryden (EAFB) on 
runway 22 and in the Mate/Demate Device (MDD). This inspection 
was performed to identify debris impact damage, and if 
possible, debris sources. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 
209 hits, of which 44 had a major dimension of one inch or 
greater. This total does not include the numerous hits on the 
base heat shield attributed to engine vibration/ acoustics and 
exhaust plume recirculation. A comparison of these numbers to 
statistics from 30 previous missions of similar configuration 
(excluding missions STS-23, 24, 25, 26, 26R, 27R, and 30R which 
had damage from known debris sources), indicates that both the 
total number of hits and the number of hits one inch or larger 
were greater than average. Figures 10-13 show the TPS debris 
damage assessment for STS-42. 
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 159 hits, of 
which 38 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. Fourteen 
of these hits had a major dimension of three inches or greater 
with 11 of these located along the forward one-third of the 
vehicle (Figure 10). All of these hits were shallow (3/8 inch 
or less) relative to the surface area. This type of tile damage 
is indicative of impact by a low density material. No residual 
debris material was observed in any of these damage sites. 
However, laboratory analysis was performed on selected tiles 
removed (intact) at KSC for replacement. 
As a result of this tile damage, a debris damage/source inves-
tigation was conducted. Post flight inspections of the Orbiter 
and recovered SRB's revealed no loss of TPS or flight hardware. 
Launch films and videos showed no debris anomalies. OV-103 was 
not equipped to carry umbilical cameras. However, the crew 
photographed (70mm still photos and 16mm motion picture) the 
External Tank after separation. This imagery showed apparent 
loss of TPS (two divots 8-12 inches in diameter) in the -Y+Z 
quadrant of the intertank acreage outboard of the -Y bipod ramp 
and forward of the LH2 tank flange closeout. However, the +Y+Z 
quadrant of the ET was not visible in any of the photos. 
The tile damage sites were large in surface area but shallow in 
depth, which is characteristic of low density impacts. The TPS 
on the SRB's is more dense and results in deeper penetration. A 
mechanism to transport ET intertank foam to the Orbiter forward 
lower surface area had been previously demonstrated. ET-52 .was 
the second tank flown with the new two-gun spray process on the 
intertank. IFA STS-42-T-001 was taken against the loss of ET 
intertank foam as the probably source for the debris damage to 
Orbiter tiles on STS-42.
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Figure 10. STS-42 
DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
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Figure 11. STS-42 
DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS 
TOTAL HITS
	 6 
HITS >1INCH 0
UREMENTS IN INCHES 
AP 
L HITS = 8 
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1 X 1 1/2 X 1/16 
1 X3/4X 1/8
Figure 12 STS-42 
DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
Figure 13. STS-42 
DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS 
16' LENGTH OF BLANKET 
LEADING EDGE SEPARATED 
FROM ADJACENT BLANKET 
AND SUBSTRATE
10 HITS BETWEEN 
WINDOW43 AND #4 
3 HITS WITH 2 > 1" 
ON WINDOW #2 FRAME 
TOTAL HITS= 36 
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1 HIT > 1"
A 5HITSWITH1>1" 
ON WINDOW #5 FRAME
	 All DIMENSIONS
 INCHES 
7 HITS ON ON WINDOW #4 FRAME
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The following table breaks down the STS-42 Orbiter debris 
damage by area:
HITS > 1"
	 TOTAL HITS 
Lower surface 38 159 
Upper surface 4 33 
Right side 0 5 
Left side 2 8 
Right OMS Pod 0 1 
Left OHS Pod 0 3 
TOTALS 44 209
No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels, 
tires, or brakes. The main landing gear tires were considered 
to be in good condition for a concrete runway landing. 
Five hits on the L02 ET/Orbiter unibilical door and four hits on 
the Orbiter lower surface were aligned and caused by a single 
debris particle (most likely ice from the L02 feedline) passing 
between the Orbiter lower surface and the door in the open/ 
latched position. 
A cluster of 26 hits smaller than one inch was located just aft 
and inboard of the LH2 ET/Orbiter umbilical. Similar clusters 
of hits have been observed in this area on previous flights and 
are probably caused by ice/debris from the umbilical. 
All ET/Orbiter (EO) separation ordnance device plungers 
appeared to have functioned properly. An ordnance connector 
from the LH2 umbilical outboard pyro location (Part No. 
NBS9GE8-2SE) fell to the runway when the ET door was opened. 
This debris was documented on PR PYR-3-14-0193. The present 
design of the umbilical pyro assemblies does not ensure debris 
retention, but a design change is in work to rectify this. The 
stop-bolts on the EO-1 separation assembly did not sustain any 
damage or bending. 
Damage to the base heat shield tiles was typical. The SSME 
closeout blankets were generally in good condition. The only 
damage consisted of detached outboard edges on the SSME #1 
blanket from 5:30 to 6:00 o'clock and on the SS #3 blanket 
from .8:00 to 9:00 o'clock. 
The coating on the LH wing leading edge RCC T-seals #7 and #8 
exhibited some blistering and spa].ling, but was not a debris 
issue. 
All Orbiter windows exhibited typical hazing. A' few small 
streaks were present on windows #3 and #4. Laboratory analysis 
was performed on samples taken from all windows. 
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The entire exterior surface (flexible insulation blanket and 
thermal barrier) of Orbiter RH vent door #7 exhibited a 
yellow-orange discoloration. This anomaly was documented on PR 
MID-3-15-2320. The surrounding Orbiter sidewall was not 
similarly discolored. Wipes were taken from the exterior 
surface of the door and from the structure inside the door 
within the Orbiter for chemical analysis. The door TPS was 
removed after ferry flight for further laboratory analysis. 
Samples were taken from other selected sites for laboratory 
analysis (Figure 14). The results of all laboratory chemical 
analyses are presented in section 9.0. 
A portable infrared radiometer was used to measure the surface 
temperatures of three areas on the Orbiter TPS after landing 
(OSD V09AJO.095). Approximately one hour after wheel stop the 
Orbiter nosecap RCC was 116 degrees F, the RH wing leading edge 
RCC panel #9 was 77 degrees F, and the RH wing leading edge RCC 
panel #17 was 76 degrees F (Figure 15). 
Runway 22 was inspected and swept by Air Force personnel on 
January 29, 1992, and all potentially damaging debris was 
removed. The lakebed runways were not usable for this mission 
due to recent rainfall. 
A post-landing inspection of runway 22 was performed 
approximately a half hour after landing. The only flight 
hardware found was a small piece of RTV rubber material from 
the strain gauge wires on the left hand inboard main landing 
gear tire. 
In summary, both the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits 
and the number of hits with a major dimension one inch or 
larger were greater than average when compared to previous 
flights (Figure 16-18) . Based on the inspection of the 
recovered SRB components and analysis of film and photographic 
data, the loss of ET intertank foam is considered the probable 
cause of this greater than average debris damage to the Orbiter 
tiles. 
Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 10.0. 
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Figure 14. STS-42 
CHEMICAL SAMPLE LOCATIONS 
RESIDUE FROM TILE DAMAGE SIT 	 DEBRIS/RESIDUE FROM V090-395055-100 & -101 	 LH UMBILICAL 
V070-395024-0081 51
RESIDUE FROM TILE - 
V070-394039-00CL49 16 
C, z	 z 
I-
I 
C, 
Re 
PIPES FROM RH VENT DOOR #17 
RESIDUE FROM 'YELLOW STREAK' 
RH FUSELAGE 
WIPES FROM ORBITER WINDOWS __)\ ftJ 
W-1 THRU 8
FOVC-oesO 
81
RCC 
TIME
103 
-42 
Figure 15. STS-42 RCC TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS 
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FIGURE 16: ORBITER POST FLIGHT DEBRIS DAMAGE SUMMARY 
LOWER SURFACE ENTIRE VEHICLE 
HITS > 1 INCH TOTAL HITS HITS> 1 INCH TOTAL HITS 
STS-6 15 80 36 120 
STS-8 3 29 7 56 
STS-9 (41-A) 9 49 14 58 
STS-11 (41-B) 11 19 34 63 
STS-13 (41-C) 5 27 8 36 
STS-14(41-D) 10 44 30 111 
STS-17 (41-G) 25 69 36 154 
STS-19 (51-A) 14 66 20 87 
STS-20 (51-C) 24 67 28 81 
STS-27 (51-I) 21 96 33 141 
STS-28 (51-J) 7 66 17 111 
STS-30 (61-A) 24 129 34 183 
STS-31 (61-B) 37 177 55 257 
STS-32 (61-C) 20 134 39 193 
STS-29 18 100 23 132 
STS-28R 13 60 20 76 
STS-34 17 51 18 53 
STS-33R 21 107 21 118 
STS-32R 13 111 15 120 
STS-36 17 61 19 81 
STS-31R 13 47 14 63 
STS-41 13 64 16 76 
STS-38 7 70 8 81 
STS-35 15 132 17 147 
STS-37 7 91 10 113 
STS-39 14 217 16 238 
STS-40 23 153 25 197 
STS-43 24 122 25 131 
STS-48 14 100 25 182 
STS-44 6 74 9 101 
AVERAGE 15.3 87.1 22.4 118.7 
SIGMA 7.3 44.7 10.9 54.9
This ANALYSIS DOES NOT INCLUDE STS-23,24,25,26,26R, 27R, AND 30R 
THESE MISSIONS HAD DAMAGE CAUSED BY KNOWN SOURCES 
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Overall view of Orbiter left side 
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I 
Overall view of Orbiter right side. Streaks on payload bay door 
and fuselage may he related to on-orbit leak of aft RCS 
thruster. Note yellow discoloration of vent door V. 
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A hydraulic fluid leak was eliminated as a possible cause of 
the yellow discoloration on vent door V. The most likely cause 
is believed to be a reaction of the RTV bonding agent through 
the flexible insulation blanket and thermal barrier. 
88
.Jr\ft]I'tL.	 L
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
iT:IEE
. 't
:2
Tile damage on the lower surface near the Orbiter nose 
generally consisted of shallow damage sites (3/8-inch or less) 
relative to the surface area. This type of tile damage is 
indicative of impact by low density m Lterial - 
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Typical tile damage on the Orbiter aft lower surface exhibited 
minor thermal erosion. 
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verall view of the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. The separation 
ordnance device debris plunger in EO-3 was seated and appeared 
to have functioned properly. Wrinkling of the interface plate, 
particularly near the aft separation bolt hole, was attributed 
to shrinkage during cryogenic chilldown. 
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Overall view of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical.
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An ordnance connector from the outboard LH2 ET/ORB umbilical 
separation system fell to the runway when the ET door was 
opened.
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The coating on the Lii wing leading edge RCC T-seals #7 and #8 
exhibited some blistering and spalling, but was not a debris 
issue.
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All Orbiter windows exhibited typical hazing. A few small 
streaks were present on windows #3 and #4 
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Typical debris found on the runway after landing. The only 
flight hardware recovered was a small piece of red RTV rubber 
material from the LH inboard main landing gear tire strain gage 
wire harness.
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Comparative views showing small piece of PTV rubber material 
attached to strain gage wires (nominal configuration) and 
missing RTV from wires on the LH inboard main landing gear. 
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9.0 DEBRIS SAMPLE LAB REPORTS 
Debris samples for the STS-42 mission are divided into three 
categories:
1. Post-landing samples 
2. Orbiter RH Vent Door #7 blanket 
3. Removed Tiles (damaged)-MSFC Analysis 
POST-LANDING SAMPLES 
A total of 13 samples were obtained from Orbiter OV-103 during 
the STS-42 post landing debris assessment atAmes-Dryden Flight 
Research Facility (ADFRF), California (Figure 14). The 
thirteen submitted samples consisted of 8 window wipes, 1 RH 
fuselage residue scraping, 3 tile samples (damage sites), and 1 
residual sample from the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical plate. The 
samples were analyzed by the NASA KSC Microchemical Analysis 
Branch (MAB) for material composition and comparison to known 
STS materials. Debris analysis involves the identification and 
correlation of particles with respect to composition, thermal 
(mission) effects, and availability. Debris sample results and 
analyses are listed by Orbiter location in the following 
summaries. 
Orbiter Windows 
Results of the window sample analysis revealed the presence of 
the following materials: 
1. Metallics 
2. RTV, silica tile, tile coating 
3. Glass fibers, insulation 
4. Paints, dust, rust and salt 
5. Organics 
6. Earth compounds 
Debris analysis provides the following correlations: 
1. Metallic particles (nickel, aluminum, cadmium and 
carbon steel alloys) are common to SRB/BSM exhaust 
residue, but are not considered a debris concern in 
these quantities (micrometer) and have not generated 
a known debris effect 
2. RTV, silica tiles, and tile coating originate from tile 
Orbiter TPS (thermal protection system). 
3. Glass •fibers and insulation materials originate from 
blanket insulation Orbiter TPS (thermal protection 
system).
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4. Paint is of flight hardware/facility/GSE origin. Dust 
and salt are naturally-occurring landing site products. 
Rust is an SRB/BSM exhaust residue. 
5. Organics are being analyzed by chemical fingerprint 
(infrared spectrometry) method; results are pending. 
This detailed process is more difficult due to small 
sample quantity (micrometer). 
6. Earth compounds (muscovite, calcite, and alpha-quartz) 
are of landing site origin. 
RH Fuselage 
Results of the RE fuselage residue sample analysis indicated 
the presence of the following materials: 
White, dense silica 
Debris analysis provides the following correlations: 
White, dense silica is normally observed in samples 
containing tile coating materials. This sample location 
is on insulation blanket. Comparative analysis is ongoing 
to further characterize this residual coating. 
Orbiter Tile 
Results of the tile sample chemical analysis revealed the 
presence of the following materials: 
1. Metal].ics 
2. Silica tile, tile coating 
3. Dust and salt 
4. Rust and paint 
Debris analysis provides the following correlations: 
1. Iron-Chromium is unique to one tile sample; the 
source cannot be conclusively defined (mission or 
sampling method contamination) due to small quantity. 
Aluminum alloy is common to SRB/BSM exhaust residue. 
Both of these particles are not considered a debris 
concern in this quantity and have not generated a known 
debris effect. 
2. Silica tile and tile coating materials are used in 
tile Orbiter TPS (thermal protection system). 
3. Dust and salt are naturally-occurring landing site 
products.
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4. Rust is an SRB/BSM exhaust residue; paint is of 
flight element, ground support equipment (GSE), or 
facility coating origin. 
LH2 Orbiter/ET Umbilical 
Results of the LH2 Orbiter/ET umbilical sample revealed the 
presence of organic materials. 
Organic materials are being analyzed by chemical fingerprint 
(Infrared spectrometry) method; results are pending. This 
detailed process is especially difficult in small sample 
quantities. 
Conclusions 
The STS-42 mission sustained Orbiter tile TPS damage to a 
greater than average degree. The chemical analysis results 
from post flight samples did not provide data that indicated a 
single source of damaging debris. Analysis' results were con-
sistent with previous missions in that no material or substance 
appeared outside of the established data base. 
Orbiter window samples provided evidence of SRB/BSM exhaust 
residue, Orbiter TPS materials, landing site products, 
organics, and paint. 
The Orbiter tile (damage site) samples were found to contain a 
variety of residuals. These residuals, including metallics, 
TPS materials, paint, and environmental products, do not estab-
lish a single source or debris effect. This sampling, when 
coupled with the MSFC analysis of removed damaged tiles, should 
provide a data base for corrective debris analysis. 
The LH2 Orbiter/ET umbilical sample was found to contain 
organic materials. Specific identification analysis is pending. 
RH ORBITER VENT DOOR #7 BLANKET 
Post-landing observation of the unusual colored vent door 
blanket resulted in the sampling and subsequent removal of the 
blanket material. Although an initial analysis was required to 
complement visual observations that a vehicle/debris problem 
was not evident, results of detailed testing concluded the vent 
door discoloration was not a debris concern. 
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OV-103 Vent Door #7 Discoloration 
After the STS-42 landing, several analyses have been performed 
on diverse wipe samples and the blanket specimen itself. 
Several sample wipes were taken at DFRF and again at KSC upon 
arrival. The wipe samples taken at DFRF included blanket 
surface and upper portion of the wing duct assembly. 
The analysis performed to date included Infrared Spectrometry 
(IR), Energy Dispersive X-rays (EDX), Scanning Electron 
Microscopy (SEM), Gas Schomotography/Mass Spectrometry (GC/MS), 
X-ray Diffraction (XD) and X-ray Photoelectron Spectroscopy 
(XPS). Initial sample analysis indicated a compound similar to 
hydraulic fluid Mil-H-82382. Subsequent lab tests performed on 
a new piece of blanket material conclusively proved that the 
cause of the discoloration was not hydraulic fluid. Most of the 
analysis consistently indicated silicone type material and 
trace compounds of a different nature. Some of the component 
elements found included tin, zinc, flourine and nitrogen. 
The tin is believed to originate from the catalyst used for 
the formulation of RTV 560 (dibutyltin dilaureate). Candidates 
for the presence of fluorine are Krytox, Braycote and 
Scotchguard. Nitrogen sources include acrylonitrile and/or 
heterocyclic nitrogen from the anti-oxidant in the Orbiter 
tires. The element zinc can originate from a primer-type 
material, but seems unlikely. Laboratory tests indicated 
minimal amounts of organic material, which may be attributed to 
"burn-off" during re-entry. 
Several other tests have been performed in which various 
Orbiter compounds were coated on new blanket material and 
heated in a vacuum oven at elevated temperature (greater than 
300 degrees C). 
The test compounds included dibutyltin, Krytox and Braycote. 
It is interesting to note that the test panels turned brown-
orange in color. No further laboratory analysis have been 
performed due to equipment failure (XPS unit). Additional 
samples that have been taken to the laboratory include Koropon 
paint primer, rubber specimens from the Shuttle tires, and a 
primed aluminum doubler. Further laboratory results are 
pending. 
Background. Information 
* A similar problem occurred on OV-103 in 1984 (maiden flight). 
Samples were taken, but no solution was found to the problem. 
The blanket was coated with C-9 compound and continued to be 
flown until 1987 when it was replaced. 
* STS-42 and STS-41D were both UV intense missions. 
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* The wheel well area was found to be clean with the exception 
of a small quantity of grease on the inboard side of the right 
landing gear door. This is an unexposed area when the Orbiter 
is in flight. 
* With the exception of a red-orange stain (2" X 2") inside the 
wing duct vent assembly, the duct was very clean. The analysis 
of the stained portion revealed a silicone-type material. 
* The ascent and descent relief doors on the wing duct vent 
assembly were in the closed position on return from flight. 
* Torque tube/push rod gear box were inspected for Braycote 
leakage and none was observed. 
* Temperature in the wheel well reached a high of 100 degrees F 
as reported by JSC. 
Note: It is suspected that the tires outgassed into the 
wing duct vent assembly. 
* Test samples of the removed vent door #7 blanket were sent 
to:
KSC lab 
RI Downey 
JSC - Materials lab 
TILES (DAMAGED) - MSFC ANALYSIS 
As a result of the significant number of damaged tiles and the 
on-orbit photographs of the External Tank showing missing foam 
from the intertank, an STS-42 TPS Tile Damage Investigation 
Team was established. This team is under the direction of the 
MSFC material laboratory and will evaluate nine damaged tiles 
removed from OV-103. The current schedule for analysis depicts 
June 1992 as a report completion date. At this time, only 
external scanning of the removed tiles has been completed. The 
results of this non-destructive testing indicated localized 
dense areas in the tile damage areas along with other trace 
elements. Destructive testing of the removed tiles is planned 
and the results are pending. Full test results will be docu-
mented when available.
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10.0 POST LAUNCH ANOMALIES 
Based on the debris inspections and film review, 10 Post Launch 
Anomalies, including one IFA candidate, were observed on the 
STS-42 mission. 
10.1 LAUNCH PAD/FACILITY 
1. Fire brick from the SRB flame trench was scattered across 
the pad acreage north to the perimeter fence. 
10.2 EXTERNAL TAM 
1. Two divots, approximately 8-10 inches in diameter, were 
located outboard of the -Y bipod ramp and forward of the LH2 
tank-to-intertank flange in the intertank acreage. The inter-
tank TPS should remain intact with no loss of material during 
ascent. Although there is no photographic data showing the 
condition of the ET TPS in the +Y+Z quadrant, the External Tank 
is the most likely source for the debris that caused the 
Orbiter tile damage. (IFA candidate) 
10.3 SOLID ROT BOOSTERS 
1. The HDP #3 Debris Containment System (DCS) plunger was not 
seated when inspected at Hangar AF during the Post Flight As-
sessment. 
2. A 2.0" x 0.25" frangible nut web lay on the hoiddown post 
#2 stud after launch. Large pieces of ordnance debris should be 
retained by the DCS. 
3. A 6" x 4" piece of aft skirt instafoain broke away near the 
inboard edge of hoiddown post #7 during liftoff. Instafoam 
closeouts should remain attached to the vehicle. 
4. TPS on the forward side of the upper strut fairing (a 311x1" 
area on the LH SRB; a 6 11 x3" area on the RH SRB) at the separa-
tion plane was missing and the substrate was charred. The loss 
of TPS in this area probably occurred during strut separation 
and may have been caused by primer delamination. 
5. Approximately 20 percent of the HDP #3 EPON shim material 
was missing and the substrate was charred. The shim material 
appeared to have been lost during ascent. 
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10.4 ORBITER 
1. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 209 hits, of which 44 
had a major dimension of 1-inch or greater. Fourteen of these 
hits had a major dimension of 3-inches or greater and eleven of 
these hits were located along the forward one-third of the 
vehicle. All of the hits were shallow (3/8-inch or less) rela-
tive to the surface area and are usually indicative of impacts 
by low density materials. A comparison of these numbers to 
statistics from 31 previous missions shows that both the total 
number of hits and the number of hits one-inch or larger were 
significantly greater than average. Post flight assessment of 
the recovered SRB's revealed no loss of MSA-2 TPS from the 
frustums and forward skirts. SOFI debris from the External Tank 
intertank and/or lower L02 tank is the most likely cause of the 
tile damage. 
2. SSNE ignition vibration/ acoustics caused the loss of tile 
surface coating material from six locations on the OMS nozzle 
heat shield and Orbiter base heat shield. 
3. An ordnance connector (P/N NBS9GE8-2SE) from the LH2 
umbilical outboard pyro separation system fell onto the runway 
when the ET door was opened.
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